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A Sliding Scale
Nuclear Proliferation Among States
by Jessica Liu
University of Maryland, College Park

Why do states engage in nuclear proliferation? Nuclear proliferation
is a major security issue affecting the international arena. Existing studies
debate both the strength and direction of determinants of nuclear
proliferation and the effect of domestic and international circumstances
on proliferation. A clear understanding of why states choose to pursue
nuclear arms is critical to promoting and maintaining international
security. By analyzing what factors may make a state less prone to
proliferation, the international community may incentivize
disarmament. My research question considers membership in the United
Nations Security Council (UNSC) as a potential correlate of nuclear
proliferation. Are countries that are members of the UNSC more likely to
engage in nuclear proliferation compared to countries that are not
elected to the UNSC?
Current scholarly research suggests many factors for proliferation.
Existing literature cites three types of determinants: technological
determinants, external determinants, and domestic determinants (Singh
& Way, 2004, p. 862). States that are more technologically advanced are
more likely to develop nuclear weapons due to a universal appeal of
nuclear arms and the reduced costs of acquiring nuclear weapons
compared to less advanced states (Singh & Way, 2004, p. 862; Jo &
Gartzke, 2007, p. 167). External determinants, such as perceived security
threats, cause a state to develop nuclear weapons in order to balance
against a rival state’s nuclear capabilities or a conventional threat. An
alliance with a major power, on the other hand, diminishes the probability
of proliferation (Bleek & Lorber, 2013, p. 1; Jo & Gartzke, 2007, p. 185;
Singh & Way, 2004, p. 863). Some argue that in relation to the democratic
peace theory, the pacifying effects of democracy and interdependence
among democratic states reduce the ambition to pursue nuclear
weapons. Quantitative tests have found that economic integration deters
nuclear proliferation, because states do not wish to threaten economic
partners (Singh & Way, 2004, p. 864).
Scholars have also tested the effects of signing the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) on nuclear proliferation,
though they have reached different conclusions. Jo and Gartzke found
that while states that have ratified the NPT ratification are less likely to
initiate nuclear programs, NPT ratification has not deterred proliferation
at the system level (Jo & Gartzke, 2007, p. 167). However, Bleek and
Lorber found that NPT ratification is significantly and negatively linked to
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all stages of proliferation (Bleek & Lorber, 2013, p. 12).
To continue the discussion of how different factors affect nuclear
proliferation, I study how being a member of the United Nations Security
Council (UNSC) affects a state’s status on nuclear proliferation. I also
control for NPT ratification and enduring rivalry. The first section of this
paper states my hypotheses and the rationale behind my predictions. The
next section explains the construction of the dataset and coding for the
variables. I then analyze the data using ordered logistic regression and
discuss my findings. The last section contains a brief overview of
considerations for future research.
THEORY
As Singh and Way (2004), among other scholars cited above,
theorize, both external and internal factors affect a state’s decision to
proliferate. I further examine this by introducing a new independent
variable, membership in the U.N. Security Council, in a model in
conjunction with variables studied by other scholars. I adopt Singh and
Way’s use of a continuum as the dependent variable to separate the
various stages a state may reach towards proliferation. The different
stages are: no significant interest in nuclear weapons, serious exploration
of nuclear weapons, pursuit of a nuclear weapons program, and
acquisition of nuclear weapons (Singh & Way, 2004, p. 861).
United Nations Security Council
I analyze the effect of membership in the United Nations Security
Council on nuclear proliferation. The UNSC is charged with maintaining
international peace and security and handles many issues relating to
deterrence (United Nations, 1945). In order to maintain international
security, members of the council must protect themselves against
potential aggressors. Thus, I expect elected states to be more likely to
have at least explored nuclear weapons. In addition, after a state has
been elected to the UNSC, it is more likely to want to increase its own
security in order to legitimize its authority as part of the council. It may
also do so to deter retaliation from other states as a result of the policies
it helps create and impose.
Hypothesis 1
States that are members of the United Nations Security Council are
more likely to engage in nuclear proliferation.
NPT Ratification
I also measure the effect of ratifying the Treaty on the
Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons on proliferation. The NPT is
currently the only multilateral binding agreement dedicated to
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disarmament. More countries have ratified the NPT than any other arms
limitation and disarmament agreement (Unites Nations Office for
Disarmament Affairs, n.d.). Although it explicitly prohibits the acquisition
of nuclear weapons, the goal of the NPT to prevent the spread of nuclear
weapons may implicitly discourage the exploration and pursuit of nuclear
weapons as well. I do not consider the relationship between being a
signatory of the NPT and acquisition of nuclear weapons in my model
because of perfect prediction, save for a few violations of the NPT.
Hypothesis 2
States that have ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons are less likely to explore or pursue nuclear weapons.
Enduring rivalry
Lastly, I analyze whether a state participates in an enduring rivalry
in any given year. A vast majority of wars and militarized disputes occur
within enduring rivalries, supporting the argument that the presence of
an enduring rivalry is a significant security threat (Singh & Way, 2004, p.
869). A state that has a history of rivalry with another state is more likely
to sense an urgency to develop nuclear weapons to protect itself. States
whose rivals possess nuclear weapons are also more likely to develop
nuclear weapons to defend against a potential preemptive strike.
Hypothesis 3
States that are involved in enduring rivalries are more likely to
engage in nuclear proliferation.
METHODOLOGY
Dependent Variable
The dataset is based on that from Singh and Way’s article (2004).
The unit of analysis, country-year, analyzes 154 countries from 19452000 (Singh & Way, 2004, 861). The dependent variable is the level of
nuclear proliferation that a state reaches. Because some states may
express interest in nuclear weapons or start to build nuclear weapons but
never progress to detonating them, I use Singh and Way’s coding of
placing proliferation on a continuum from 0 to 3. This accounts for states
having many possible stopping points while on the path to proliferation.
0 demonstrates that a state has expressed no interest in nuclear
weapons, 1 serious exploration of the possibility of developing weapons,
2 substantial efforts to develop weapons, and 3 acquisition of nuclear
weapons capability. Exploration is coded for the year a country first
considers building nuclear weapons, as shown by political authorization
or research by defense agencies that may oversee potential weapons
development. Pursuit is defined as when states make an active effort to

Journal of Undergraduate Research and Creative Activity, Vol. I | 155

A Sliding Scale

gain nuclear weapons, such as through a cabinet-level political decision
or movement toward weaponization. Acquisition is coded from the year a
country has its first explosion or possession of a nuclear weapon (Singh &
Way, 2004, p. 866-867). If a country renounces its nuclear weapons,
subsequent years are coded as 0 to indicate no further interest in nuclear
weapons.
Singh and Way break down the level of nuclear proliferation
variable into separate dichotomous variables for the stages
of exploration, pursuit, and acquisition. I utilize these to analyze how the
independent variables affect whether a state achieves each stage of the
nuclear continuum. Once a country achieves a value of 1 for a stage
during a specific year, observations for future years under that stage are
dropped and coded as missing. I employ ordered logistic regression
because the dependent variable is ordinal. I cluster using country codes
established by the Correlates of War project, so that observations for
various years are grouped by country (Correlates of War Project, 2006).
This accounts for the inherent correlation of observations made within
the same country.
Independent Variables
I create a dichotomous variable for the years that a state is elected
into the UNSC. The dichotomous variable utilizes 0 for non-membership
during a country-year and 1 for membership. The coding for membership
in theUnited Nations Security Council is taken from the United Nations
website (United States Security Council, 2013). Countries are elected for
two-year terms, although a few countries served on the council for just
one year in a given period.
Several countries posed coding challenges. Taiwan, officially known
as the Republic of China, was originally a permanent member of the UNSC
until its seat was replaced by the People’s Republic of China in October
1971 (United Nations Gneral Assembly, 1971). I code Taiwan as a
member of the UNSC until 1971 and China as a member from 1971
onwards. Both are coded as 1 in 1971 because each was a member for a
portion of the year. The United Arab Republic, consisting of Egypt and
Syria, was a member of the UNSC from 1961-1962 (United Nations, n.d.).
However, it split in October 1961, after which Egypt adopted the original
name. Syria and Egypt are both coded as members separately in 1961,
but only Egypt is coded as a member in 1962.
The data on whether a state is an NPT signatory is merged from a
dataset created by Jo and Gartzke (2007). The variable is dichotomous,
with a 0 representing a state that did not ratify the treaty during that year
and a 1 representing a state that ratified it. The dataset’s observations
span from 1939 to 1992, while Singh and Way’s observations span from
1945-2000. When I merge Jo and Gartzke’s data into Singh and Way’s
dataset, observations prior to 1945 are dropped, and the values for
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the NPT ratification after 1992 are coded as missing.
The variable for enduring rivalry is from Singh and Way’s original
dataset (2004). The presence of an enduring rivalry accounts for a
significant portion of the security threat facing a state. The authors adopt
coding from another article by Bennet (1998) and utilize a dichotomous
variable whose value is 1 if the state is involved in one or more enduring
rivalries in a given year, and is 0 if not. There are no issues of
multicollinearity, or correlations of ±0.6 or greater, among the variables
in my models. Because the variables for exploration, pursuit, and
acquisition of nuclear weapons are combined into the variable for level of
nuclear proliferation, there is logically a high correlation of the three with
the level of nuclear proliferation. To avoid multicollinearity, I perform
regressions for exploration, pursuit, and acquisition separately from the
regression on level of nuclear proliferation. The correlation table is
below:

DISCUSSION
Before testing my variables, I explore the distribution of states on
the nuclear proliferation continuum (Graph 1). This information allows a
more detailed understanding of the statuses of states on nuclear
proliferation. Only countries that have at minimum shown interest in
nuclear proliferation, or that have been coded as 1 or higher for the level
variable, are analyzed. If a country has reached multiple stages of nuclear
proliferation, the achievement of each stage is factored into the
calculations in order to holistically gauge how far countries overall have
progressed on the continuum. Almost half of the countries studied have
explored weapons, but less than a third have seriously pursued nuclear
weapons, and less than a quarter have acquired them. However, these
observations are limited by their small sample size, as over 90% of 152
countries in the dataset have shown no interest in domestic nuclear
programs.
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Figure 1

Table 1 shows that although hypotheses 1 and 3 hold true,
hypothesis 2 is proven incorrect. Countries that are members of the
United Nations Security Council are 2.25 times more likely to achieve a
higher rating on the level of nuclear proliferation than countries that are
not members. Countries that experience enduring rivalry are also
significantly more likely to achieve a higher rating than countries that do
not have enduring rivalry, although the coefficient is 1.78, which denotes
a smaller effect than that of the UNSC variable. Both relationships are
significant because they have a P-value of 0.00.
Ratification of the NPT has no significant relationship with a state’s
status on nuclear proliferation. This finding was unexpected because
states that are resolved against acquiring nuclear weapons may be
assumed to also be less likely to explore and pursue nuclear weapons. In
addition, the result challenges the conclusions of Jo and Gartzke (2007)
and Bleek and Lorber (2013). The disparity may be explained by my
simplistic model, which has only a few independent variables and focuses
on external determinants of nuclear proliferation. By adding variables
such as technological development and economic factors into a future
model, signatory status may become significant.
Other explanations for the lack of significance include the
circumstances surrounding the treaty. Signing the NPT may not
necessarily change state preferences for exploring or pursuing weapons
(Jo & Gartzke, 2007, p. 179). Many treaties are signed as formalities
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because they represent actions states would have undertaken regardless
of the presence of the treaty (Downs, Rocke and Barsoom 1996, p. 380).
In this vein, the NPT may have been ineffective in deterring nuclear
proliferation because states have agreed to avoid acquiring nuclear
capability, but may continue to explore and pursue weapons.

Independent
Variables

Level of Nuclear Proliferation

Coefficient
(R.S.E.)
Rivalry 1.782 (.476)
NPT -.495 (.372)

Ratification
UNSC 2.252 (.480)

P-Value
0.000
0.183
0.000

Figure 2. Bolded coefficients are significant at the p<0.05 level.

I disaggregate each stage of proliferation from the variable for
level of proliferation in order to consider the effects of the independent
variables on each stage. Before executing the regression, NPT ratification
seems to reduce the likelihood that the state will explore and pursue
nuclear weapons (Graph 2). This is in accordance with the belief that
signing the treaty deters proliferation. However, a logistic regression
demonstrates that NPT ratification still has an insignificant effect on
proliferation (Table 2). A near-significant relationship is found between
exploration of nuclear weapons and ratification of the NPT. States that
have signed the NPT are -0.90 times less likely to explore nuclear
weapons, but there is a 6.1% probability of the observed relationship
being due to chance. I include the independent variables of rivalry and
UNSC membership in this model in order to take into account their
explanatory power. The UNSC and rivalry variables stay significant,
except for the effect of UNSC membership on pursuit, which is just above
the threshold of significance.
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Figure 3.

Independent
Variables

Exploration
Coefficient P(R.S.E.)
Value

Rivalry 1.878 (.430)

0.000

NPT -.903 (.481)
Ratification*
UNSC 1.172 (.451)

Pursuit
Coefficient
(R.S.E.)

P-Value
0.000

0.061

2.894
(.754)
-.935 (.658)

0.009

.988 (.577)

0.087

0.155

Acquire
Coefficient
(R.S.E.)

PValue

2.821
(1.123)
--*

0.012

1.690
(.704)

0.023

--*

Figure 4. *Npt_rati is omitted due to perfect prediction. The NPT prohibits signatories
from acquiring nuclear weapons.

To further explore the effect of UNSC membership on state
behavior, I analyze the differences between members of the UNSC and
non-members and the average action they take regarding proliferation. I
utilize the dichotomous variables of whether a state explored, pursued,
or acquired nuclear weapons to separate the effects for each stage on the
nuclear continuum. States that have been members of the UNSC show
higher means of exploration, pursuit, and acquisition (Graph 3). This
provides additional support for hypothesis 1, and predicts that members
of the UNSC are more likely to exhibit higher levels of nuclear
proliferation than states that are not members of the UNSC.
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Figure 5.

CONCLUSION
Although nuclear proliferation is a growing concern, there are a
limited number of nuclear states. Thus, the small sample size of states
that have acquired nuclear weapons constrains the applicability of my
findings. In order to limit observations to before the year 2000, I also did
not code for countries that were elected to the United Nations Security
Council after 2000.
Future studies on proliferation may include an updated dataset in
order to analyze how states’ attitudes towards nuclear proliferation have
evolved. Controls, such as whether proliferation occurred during the Cold
War and geographical region may be added. Motivations to proliferate
during the Cold War may differ from motivations during other time
periods due to the global political climate. Different regions may also
share traits that affect states’ decisions to proliferate. In addition, the
coding of being a party to the NPT can be modified to include states that
have acceded or succeeded to the NPT to analyze if a significant
relationship exists.
Further research may also help explain why some states back down
or reverse their decision to proliferate. Some states have voluntarily given
up their nuclear arsenal or stopped their pursuit and exploration -- no
longer exhibiting interest in nuclear weapons. A comparison of some of
the traits of these countries may uncover findings about how to promote
disarmament. The threat of nuclear warfare and immense consequences
of unchecked nuclear proliferation demand immediate attention. As the
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international community works to establish peace and security among
countries, it must better understand the basis for nuclear proliferation
before it can successfully promote non-proliferation and global
disarmament.
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